What We Cannot Do to Each Other. On Forgiveness and Moral Vulnerability
Forgiveness typically becomes an issue where an offender has wronged a victim. What the offender and his victim are concerned with when engaging in a process of asking for and granting forgiveness includes the social relations that previously existed between them. It is against the background of the...
| Autor Principal: | Fricke, Christel; Universidad de Oslo |
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| Formato: | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| Idioma: | spa |
| Publicado: |
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana
2015
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: |
http://revistas.javeriana.edu.co/index.php/vniphilosophica/article/view/13290 |
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| Sumario: |
Forgiveness typically becomes an issue where an offender has wronged a victim. What the offender and his victim are concerned with when engaging in a process of asking for and granting forgiveness includes the social relations that previously existed between them. It is against the background of these relations that the question arises whether there can be a duty for a victim to forgive and a right for an offender to be forgiven. I suggest distinguishing between personal and moral relations between people; the latter bind every rational agent to the community of all moral agents, whereas the former are a personal matter. Accordingly, I distinguish between personal and moral forgiveness. And I argue that the offender has a right to be morally forgiven, either by the victim herself or by another member of the community of moral agents; but the victim does not have a duty to forgive the offender personally. |
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