Escepticismo y suspensión del juicio en la teoría nominalista del conocimiento de Francisco Suárez
The aim of this study is to offer a reflection on the theory of knowledge ofFrancisco Suárez and his nominalism in the light of Sextus Empiricus’ sceptical thought in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. It is Sextus who allows us to compare the epistemology of Suárez with a dynamic system of knowledge. With...
Autor Principal: | Yangali, Oscar |
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Formato: | Artículo |
Idioma: | spa |
Publicado: |
Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
2016
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: |
http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/estudiosdefilosofia/article/view/15887/16319 |
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Sumario: |
The aim of this study is to offer a reflection on the theory of knowledge ofFrancisco Suárez and his nominalism in the light of Sextus Empiricus’ sceptical thought in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. It is Sextus who allows us to compare the epistemology of Suárez with a dynamic system of knowledge. With this in view, in the first place, I examine Sextus’s scepticism and Suárez’s nominalist ontology. In the second place, I analyse the mental representation as conceived by Sextus in analogy with the formal and objective concepts of Suárez, and I also discuss the concept of relation in both authors. Finally, I proceed to examine the concept of belief inasmuch as certain restrictions in the configuration of our judgements are manifest and recognized. |
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