μήτ᾿ ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι μήτε σῶμά τι ἡ ψυχή (Aristóteles, De anima B 2. 414 a 19-20)
In this essay I argue that there are no reasons to believe that Aristotle would have agreed with psychological functionalism, i.e. the thesis maintaining that the identity of a mental state is determined by its causal relations with sensorial stimuli, other mental states or conduct. From such a gen...
| Autor Principal: | Boeri, Marcelo D., 1958- |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicado: |
2019
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| Acceso en línea: |
0392-7342 |
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| Sumario: |
In this essay I argue that there are no reasons to believe that Aristotle would have agreed with psychological functionalism, i.e. the thesis maintaining that the identity of a mental state is determined by its causal relations with sensorial stimuli, other mental states or conduct. From such a general characterization it follows that the mental states are "multiply realizable'', as they can occur in different systems under the only condition that such systems perform their functions properly. In § 2 seven arguments, some textual and others conceptual, are offered against the funcionalist interpretation of Aristotle's psychology In § 3 I try to show that the Aristotelian "functionalism'' can be perfectly understood without assuming some basic premises of contemporary funcionalism; in § 4 I briefly deal with the difficulty that some contemporary approaches have to attribute causal powers to the mind, and I contrast such a view with the causal role of certain psychic states in the Aristotelian psychology. |
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