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Whither Contract Damages: Contracts with Bilateral Reliance, One-sided Private Information

This article explores the canonical contracting problem in a general set up of bilateral “selfish” reliance with post contractual one-sided asymmetric information, helping uncover the shape optimal contracts and the optimal damage remedies. The quantity choice of the traded commodity is initially bi...

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Autor Principal: Bag, Sugata
Formato: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Idioma: spa
Publicado: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana 2013
Materias:
Contract Law; Contract Breach; Incomplete Contracts; Moral Hazards; Mechanism Design.
derecho de los contratos; incumplimiento del contrato; contratos incompletos; riesgo moral; diseño de mecanismos.
droit des contrats; non-respect du contrat; contrats incomplets; risque moral; conception de mécanismes.
Acceso en línea: http://revistas.javeriana.edu.co/index.php/revmaescom/article/view/7167
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