Los sesgos cognitivos en la toma de decisiones
This paper reviews the “Heuristics and biases” program initiated by Tversky & Kahneman in 1970, and thanks to which Daniel Kahneman shared the Economic Sciences Nobel Prize in 2002. These authors have proved that there are a lot of biases in individuals' intuitions about the potential occur...
| Autor Principal: | Cortada de Kohan, Nuria |
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| Formato: | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| Idioma: | spa |
| Publicado: |
Editorial Bonaventuriana
2018
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: |
Cortada de Kohan, N. (2008). Los sesgos cognitivos en la toma de decisiones. International Journal of Psychological Research, 1(1), 68–73. https://doi.org/10.21500/20112084.968 |
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| Sumario: |
This paper reviews the “Heuristics and biases” program initiated by Tversky & Kahneman in 1970, and thanks to which Daniel Kahneman shared the Economic Sciences Nobel Prize in 2002. These authors have proved that there are a lot of biases in individuals' intuitions about the potential occurrence of any event. The paper describes several biases and gives examples where this statement can be observed including the base rate fallacy and the conjunction fallacy to mention only but a few. In addition, this work underlines the complex problem of decision-making in uncertainty cases, reviews the prospect theory and the overconfidence bias this paper's author is presently working on. |
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