Act, Object, Content: to Think Intentionality from Kazimierz Twardowski’s Work”
The article takes as a point of departure Brentano`s intentionalist theory and its problematic distinction between intentional and transcendent object, in order to present the way in which Twardowski reformulates these concepts by means of a differentiation between the content and th...
| Autor Principal: | Niel, Luis |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Idioma: | spa |
| Publicado: |
Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades
2015
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: |
http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/113270 |
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| Sumario: |
The article takes as a point of departure Brentano`s intentionalist theory and its problematic distinction between intentional and transcendent object, in order to present the way in which Twardowski reformulates these concepts by means of a differentiation between the content and the object of representations: on the one hand, the ‘content’ is the way of givenness of an object and fulfils an intermediary function between the act and its objective correlate; on the other hand, the ‘object’ is the necessary transcendent correlate of every representation, even of those, whose objects do not exist. In this context, it is the dimension of judgment that solves the problem of nonexistent objects. The final aim is to show how Twardowski presents an articulated theory that integrates an intentionalist theory of acts with a theory of objects and a philosophical semantics of sense (content). |
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