Management contracts and competition in prices or quantities as strategic tools for differentiated duopoly

This article analyzes a differentiated duopoly, in which each business use twos strategic tools to compete with its rival: management incentive contracts, and a choice between prices and quantities. Using the non-cooperative game theory, it is found in equilibrium that (i) when the businesses (i) do...

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Autor Principal: Castillo Velosa, Monique
Otros Autores: Jácome Liévano, Flavio
Formato: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Idioma: spa
Publicado: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana 2011
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Acceso en línea: http://revistas.javeriana.edu.co/index.php/cuadernos_admon/article/view/1771
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