Earnings Management and Contests for Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms
In this paper, the influence of large shareholders on earnings management in family-owned firms is analyzed using a sample of firms from nine European countries. How contests for control for the largest shareholder and the existence of a controlling coalition in family-owned firms affect earnings ma...
| Autor Principal: | Jara, Mauricio |
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| Otros Autores: | López, Félix |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicado: |
Social Science Research Network
2015
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: |
Journal of CENTRUM Cathedra 4 |
| Etiquetas: |
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| Sumario: |
In this paper, the influence of large shareholders on earnings management in family-owned firms is analyzed using a sample of firms from nine European countries. How contests for control for the largest shareholder and the existence of a controlling coalition in family-owned firms affect earnings management is considered. It was found that increases in the contestability of control by the largest shareholder reduce earnings management in family-owned firms. The results also show that in firms in which the largest shareholder is a family member, a second or third family shareholder increases discretionary accruals. |
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